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The use of 
transitology in the 
field of transitional 
justice: a critique 
of the literature on 
the ‘third wave’ of 
democratisation
In the 1990s, transitional justice emerged as an 
academic discipline at the intersection of theories 
of democratic transitions (or transitology)1 and 
international human rights law.2 While the ori-
gins of the field can be traced back to the 1960s 
in scholarship addressing the purges and trials 
held after the Second World War,3 the term and 
concept “transitional justice” were coined in the 
particular context of the “third wave” of democ-
ratisation.4 They referred to legal responses for 
redressing past abuses, which were to be de-
signed and evaluated in terms of their capacity 
to entrench democratic stability and the rule of 
law.5 This approach was initially forged by tran-
sitologists in the course of the 1980s and at the 
beginning of the 1990s, during political upheav-
als in Southern Europe, Latin America and East-
ern Europe.6 They tackled the relationship be-
tween accountability for human rights violations 
and prospects for democratisation, and drew up 
prescriptive conclusions as to whether and when 
to punish crimes committed by former dictatori-
al regimes. They also pointed to different factors 
that influence the processes of reckoning with 
nondemocratic pasts (see below). 
In the last two decades transitional justice has 
turned into an extremely heterogeneous re-
search field, spanning disciplines as diverse as 
law, political sciences, sociology, psychology, 
anthropology and history. The impact of transi-
tology on the development of transitional justice 
remained, however, substantial until the first dec-
ade of this century, especially in the field of po-
litical science and law. On the one hand, the re-
lationship between justice, the rule of law and 
democratisation became a core topic of transi-
tional justice. The processes of “coming to terms 
with the past” continued to be assessed in con-
nection with their consequences for democratic 
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consolidation.7 On the other hand, the factors and categories invoked by transitologists to explain and 
predict the course of democratisation were borrowed, updated and refined by various transitional 
justice scholars in the attempt to apply them to their own research field.8 Moreover, as in the case of 
theories of democratic transitions, researches into the question of “dealing with the past” were often 
sponsored by governmental (mainly the US) or intergovernmental organisations (such as the United 
Nations, World Bank or European Union), with the aim of producing standard references and “best 
solutions” for transitional justice, in accordance with the political constraints of transition.9 
In this article I critically examine the role and limits of transitology in framing transitional justice 
studies after the breakdown of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, Latin America and East-
ern Europe. I focus on the main theoretical and methodological approaches that have been pio-
neered by transitologists and developed subsequently by transitional justice scholars. My study 
is by no means an exhaustive review of the entire transitional justice literature. Constructing a 
bibliographical essay to account for all approaches and studies on the topic would be a major un-
dertaking and beyond the scope of this article. The article engages only with an analysis of ideas 
and debates inherited by transitional justice studies from transitology. It mainly focuses on political 
science and law approaches, but addresses also critiques formulated by historians and sociolo-
gists. As transitology has dealt almost exclusively with forms of domestic retributive justice (crim-
inal trials and purges undertaken in national settings), I have narrowed the scope of my analysis 
to such mechanisms, and set to one side the debates relating to international criminal law or to 
distributive and truth-oriented policies (such as rehabilitations and reparation programmes, truth 
commissions or policies of memorialisation). 
The major topics identified and discussed here are: (1) the connections between justice for past abus-
es and democratisation, (2) the determinants of transitional justice and (3) the relationship between 
accountability and the passage of time. I argue that while transitology has nurtured important re-
search initiatives in the field of transitional justice, its approaches have serious shortcomings. First, 
because transitology sought to formulate guidelines for installing and consolidating democracy, its 
approaches became prescriptive, rather than analytical and comprehensive. They remained short-
term in focus, and often dehistoricised social phenomena. Second, in adopting a teleological perspec-
tive on transitions supposedly bound for democracy, they overlooked comparisons and intercon-
nections between transitional justice processes originating in democratic contexts and those arising 
from dictatorial settings. Third, in their attempt to build general typologies and establish causalities 
between types of dictatorial regimes, exit modes from authoritarianism and justice mechanisms, 
transitological approaches often failed to explain the actual peculiarities of national cases. Also, be-
cause they analysed transitions almost exclusively as domestic/national processes, they underesti-
mated the role of international contexts and transnational interactions. 
1. Transitional justice and democratisation 
Within the framework of democratic transition and consolidation, one important question was: how 
should societies deal with crimes committed by the previous dictatorial regimes in order to ensure 
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justice and democratic stability? Two different answers divided both scholars and political elites. 
The first one held that retributive justice for past abuses might jeopardise the new democratic pro-
ject, and that an amnesty might be a more appropriate policy for ensuring a peaceful transition 
from authoritarian rule. Conversely, the second one argued that the arraignment of former dicta-
torial leaders would strengthen the democratic values of human rights and the rule of law, being 
thus an essential part of the democratisation process.
According to the first perspective, trials and purges might antagonise the supporters of the oust-
ed regime and push them into violent contestation of the new political order.10 While ideally viola-
tions of human rights should be prosecuted, governments must limit trials when they endanger 
democratic consolidation. This was particularly asserted for transitions where a dominant military 
elite had conditionally transferred power in return for amnesty, as was the case with Argentina and 
Chile in the 1980s.11 Issues of regional security are also evoked as an argument against trials and 
purges. In circumstances where there is a fragile security context (for example, Greece during the 
Cyprus crisis), retributive justice is halted in order to avoid internal divisions and the alienation of 
the army.12 In cases of transitions from war to peace, certain scholars surmise that prosecutions 
exacerbate political tensions between the opposed camps and risk causing further atrocities. Am-
nesties, or simply turning a blind eye to past abuses, are considered more instrumental in achiev-
ing peace and democracy.13 As far as purges (or lustration in Eastern Europe) are concerned, they 
are deemed to be at odds with the democratic project, because they raise two major problems of 
the rule of law. On the one hand, they are based on the principle of collective guilt and disquali-
fy people because of their political beliefs. On the other, they are often conducted by extrajudicial 
bodies following extrajudicial procedures.14 According to this perspective, states should thus not 
focus on backward-looking measures, but on forward-looking goals such as the establishment of 
a constitutional regime, and institutional and economic reform.15 
Conversely, other scholars argue that, despite the risks involved in criminal procedures, the “least 
worst” strategy is to prosecute and punish.16 Trials based on due process affirm a new legal order 
entrenched in the rule of law. They bolster people’s trust in justice, and undermine the culture of im-
punity with regard to political crimes and abuses.17 Ignoring gross violations of human rights would 
instead shore up the sense of immunity of the old elites. It would bury not only the past, but also the 
ethical values that a society needs to ensure its democratic future. In the context of the late twentieth 
century, these values were defined in terms of political liberalism, civil and political rights, and indi-
vidual accountability. In post-1989 Eastern Europe, lustration was defended as a solution designed to 
minimise the influence of the former communist, undemocratic elites on the democratising present.18 
The attempts to build a theory of retributive transitional justice and democratisation are problemat-
ic for several reasons. First, local particularities result in different outcomes that can become “us-
able pasts” for the advocates both of trials and of amnesties. Argentina after 1983 became the key 
example cited by those arguing against prosecutions. The arraignment of army officers for crimes 
committed during the Dirty War provoked military rebellions, which in their turn led democratic 
president Raúl Alfonsín to limit and finally to put an end to criminal prosecutions.19 Postdictato-
rial Greece was for its part invoked as a successful example of retributive justice. Between 1975 
and 1976, twenty junta members were prosecuted for conducting the military coup of 1967, and 
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many other officers and conscripts were judged for violations of human rights committed during 
the Colonels’ regime.20 Most transitional justice scholars consider that, in the context of the Cyprus 
crisis, the decision of Karamanlis’ new democratic government to limit the number of purges and 
trials was taken in order to avoid disaffection and hostility within the army. However, they also con-
cede that prosecutions curbed the power of the former military elites and helped to consolidate 
the democratic project.21 The Argentinian and Greek cases are only two examples that show that 
attempts to discern general causalities between justice and democratisation are frequently ham-
pered by the diversity of national/local historical contexts, which give rise to different outcomes. 
Second, theories of democratic transitions, and transitional justice studies inspired by them, adopt 
a short-term perspective on the postdictatorial transformations. They do not take into account the 
fact that arrangements that seem to have positive effects in the first phase of transition may have 
negative consequences in the longer run. In Chile, for example, the absence of prosecutions was 
deemed in the 1990s to have favoured democratic stability.22 More recent studies, however, argue 
that impunity delayed democratisation because it allowed the army to postpone its reform and 
to retain a strong influence over Chilean society.23 There are also controversial debates about the 
long-term consequences of lustration in Eastern Europe. In the 1990s, Letki considered postcom-
munist purges in the Czech Republic to have been a success story, since they had minimised the 
influence of former nomenklatura within society.24 Choi and David likewise argue that the dismissal 
of former elites fostered trust in the new government. However, they also show that in the long run 
lustration did not have “a negative effect on trust in the tainted official”, but on the contrary enforced 
trust in former communist elites.25 What is more, one problem that social scientists constantly en-
counter is the fact that the relationship between two social facts might be attributed to an unnoticed 
third factor. In the case of retributive justice and democratisation, it is hard to isolate the impact of 
trials and purges from that of institutional reforms, economic conditions or international contexts. 
Third, most of the studies that deal with the relationship between justice and democratisation in-
herit from transitology a highly prescriptive approach to social phenomena. The main focus is of-
ten on rationalising the “proper solutions” that are supposed to lead in the “right direction”, rather 
than on providing a comprehensive account of what has occurred. 26 This implies an evaluation of 
past events according to present criteria. It also leads to a tendency to dehistoricise social facts 
and to ignore the influence of long-term historical processes. A wider temporal space is usually 
lacking in such analyses. 
1.1. Transitional justice beyond the democratisation framework
Rooted in the theories of democratic transitions, transitional justice as an academic discipline is 
nowadays confined to countries that aspire to become constitutional democracies. The concept 
implies an understanding of justice framed by the Western vision of the rule of law and by a teleo-
logical perspective on transitions supposedly bound for democracy. The origins of the “justice cas-
cade” or of the “age of accountability” are identified in events following the collapse of dictatorships 
in Greece or Argentina.27 Consequently, the bulk of the scholarly literature focuses exclusively on 
countries from the “third wave” of democratisation. The handful of studies that widen the perspec-
tive and include post-Second World War trials and purges do, however, limit their analysis to meas-
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ures adopted in Western democratic countries.28 Processes originating in the state-socialist world 
or in other authoritarian settings are excluded from the transitional justice concept and literature. 
A broader framework – over and above its purportedly necessary connection to democratisation 
– would be more heuristic for understanding how the issue of dealing with the past was compre-
hended in different epochs or ideological contexts. To what extent did debates about retroactivity, 
purges or disqualifications differ from democratic to authoritarian settings, and how did they influ-
ence each other? In the field of international human rights law, a long-term approach – extending 
beyond the boundaries of the liberal democracies – would allow significant insights into the role 
of authoritarian regimes (state-socialist or other) in calling for the adoption of international con-
ventions regarding genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It would also explain why 
certain ideas originating in, or strongly endorsed by, the state-socialist world won the backing of 
the West (for example, the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide or the 1967 International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), while oth-
ers, such as the 1968 UN Convention on War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, or the 1973 UN 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, failed to attain global 
momentum? And finally, to what extent and how were laws promoted in the international arena by 
the socialist states used after 1989 in order to punish crimes committed by these same regimes? 
Answers to these questions could better clarify the global, entangled evolution of ideas about ac-
countability in times of radical political transformation since 1945. They would also underline the 
interconnections between post-Second World War justice initiatives in Europe and Asia, processes 
originating in the state-socialist and the postcolonial world, and liberal “third wave” approaches to 
transitional justice. They could explain why certain norms and practices acquired global or trans-
regional importance, and, why others remained locally embedded or failed to make their mark in 
international practices. 
2. The determinants of transitional justice 
Another important contribution of transitology to the field of transitional justice concerns the fac-
tors that shape the processes of dealing with the past. Three main determinants invoked by tran-
sitologists to explain and predict the course of democratisation were also applied to transitional 
justice policy making: (1) the type of transition; (2) the nature of the previous regime; and (3) the 
international context. While most scholars analyse these aspects as interrelated factors, a certain 
hierarchy among them is also posited. 
2.1. Transitional justice and the exit from authoritarianism
Among the first to dwell on the topic, Huntington identified the exit mode from authoritarian rule as 
the main variable that influences transitional justice. He classified the “third wave” of transitions into 
three categories, each of which would have consequences for the future of democracy: replace-
ments, transformations and transplacements.29 Rustow, for his part, wrote of overthrow, reform 
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and compromise.30 The first (replacement or overthrow) involves a revolutionary overthrow of the 
authoritarian regime. The second (transformation or reform) is driven by reformers within the au-
thoritarian regime. The third (transplacement or compromise) involves negotiations between the 
opposition and the authoritarian elites. According to Huntington, replacements of the old regime 
generate harsher manifestations of postdictatorial justice, while transformations and transplace-
ments involve more indulgent policies towards the past.31 Using Rustow’s categories, Huyse sup-
ports the same argument.32 
This approach is problematic from several points of view. First, creating typologies of exit modes 
from authoritarianism often empties transition processes of their complexity, “giving them the 
simplicity of essences” and endowing them with a “blissful” but misleading clarity.33 For example, 
the ways Argentina and Romania exited authoritarianism in 1983 and 1989, respectively, both in-
cluded in the replacement/overthrow category, were in fact quite different. Even if the Argentini-
an military junta lacked popular support, or a reformist movement, its leaders peacefully initiated 
and negotiated the transition.34 By contrast, the Romanian communist elites violently suppressed 
the December 1989 mass protests, causing the death of at least 1,100 people.35 Also, defining Bul-
garia as a case of transformation overlooks complex interactions between governmental elites, 
dissidents and the masses. In 1989, reformist elites within the communist party overthrew Todor 
Zhivkov, without however immediately initiating a transition to political pluralism. Anticommunist 
mass protests erupted after Zhivkov’s fall and forced the new communist leaders to enter into 
negotiations with the opposition, and finally to hold free elections.36 Establishing categories of exit 
modes often leads scholars to neglect the actual peculiarities of national cases. 
Second, this approach analyses transitional justice as if it were a process driven exclusively by po-
litical elites, paying little attention to other social actors. Protests, movements and the “resurrec-
tion of civil societies” in general are seen as short-lived and disruptive episodes, having relatively 
little impact on the course of transition.37 Recent scholarship on Latin America and Eastern Eu-
rope emphasises, however, that citizen-led claims or pressure from NGOs are a powerful motor 
of transitional justice.38 The focus on elite negotiations also ignores the role of the judiciary as a rel-
atively autonomous agency. Justice is here viewed as an exclusive product of politics. The specific 
dynamics of law, which, although socially embedded, obeys its own procedures and temporalities, 
are overlooked.39 The analysis of transitional justice only in terms of elite games and negotiations 
oversimplifies both politics and law. A more heuristic framework would focus on how other actors, 
of many different kinds, understand and engage in transitional justice processes. 
Third, the exit mode factor fails to explain by itself the so-called “second wave of dealing with the 
past” that occurred in Eastern Europe, Latin America and even in Spain many years after the fall of 
the dictatorship. In Argentina in 2005, for example, more than 20 years after the transition, the su-
preme court declared as unconstitutional and repealed the amnesty laws passed by the Alfonsín 
administration in 1986. Since that date, more than 50 military officers have been convicted of mur-
der and of perpetrating forced disappearances.40 Likewise, in Chile and Guatemala, trials were only 
staged ten full years after the collapse of the dictatorship.41 By the same token, in Eastern Europe 
many countries adopted lustration laws some 10 or 15 years after the fall of the dictatorial regime. 
Among them: Poland in 1997 (implemented in 1999), Romania in 2000 and Bulgaria in 2006.42 
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These critiques do not imply that the type of transition does not count at all. Initial arrangements 
have consequences for future events, but they may be reversed if or when other factors come 
into play. The concept of exit mode, as conceptualised by transitologists, is static and determin-
istic, since it assumes that the initial configuration remains a stable variable and is not subject to 
further transformation. It ignores the fact that transitions are by definition dynamic and uncertain 
processes and can have indefinite outcomes. Moreover, extrication paths are considered to be a 
precise temporal sequence within the transition process. But how can we determine and isolate 
such sequences? When does transition begin and when does it end? 
2.2. Transitional justice and the legacy of the past
Another approach, pioneered by transitologists like O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan, or 
Kitschelt et al., argues that the nature of the previous dictatorial regime is the major factor that 
shapes democratisation and transitional justice.43 In their view, the greater the degree of liberal-
isation of the previous regime, the greater the tendency to forget past abuses and to embrace a 
moderate model of retributive justice. The scale of the repression, the types of crime committed, 
the duration of the former dictatorial rule, its degree of militarisation, or its degree of legitima-
cy through societal cooptation are all factors evoked nowadays by transitional justice scholars.44
However, the “legacy of the past approach” is generally confined to the nature of the former re-
gime and does not identify factors that go beyond that period. Stan’s analysis of Eastern Europe 
is one of the few exceptions. While she concludes that “the scope and pace of reckoning with the 
past are strongly linked to the relationship between regime and opposition during communism 
and post-communism”, she also underlines the importance of a country’s pre-communist expe-
rience of political pluralism.45 Huyse, for his part, draws attention to the fact that earlier experienc-
es of dealing with the past may influence present forms of accountability, but he does not develop 
this point.46 From a more analytical perspective, Mouralis and Weinke underline how the post-1945 
West German experience of reckoning with national socialism had a strong impact after 1990 on 
retributive justice regarding crimes committed by the GDR authorities.47 However, even these stud-
ies focus mainly on political rather than sociohistorical aspects. The role of legal culture in retro-
spective justice, or the role of a nation’s master historical narrative in shaping justice, are gener-
ally overlooked in the literature. 
Moreover, as in the case of perspectives focusing on exit modes, so too an approach stressing 
“the legacy of the past” cannot fully account for the continuity or resurgence of transitional justice 
measures long after the collapse of the dictatorial regimes. This is why authors such as Welsh, 
Barahona de Brito et al., Nalepa, or Williams, Fowler and Szczerbiak introduced a new variable 
that explains the course of accountability, namely, the postauthoritarian political competition. While 
the nature of the previous regime or the international ideological context count for something, the 
balance of power between the old and the new political elites, the coalition-building strategies and 
the elite tactics of using the past to acquire legitimacy in the new democratic order represent the 
major determinants that influence the course of justice. This approach can also shed light on the 
constant re-emergence of the “issue of the past” on the political agenda even many years after the 
fall of the dictatorship.48 
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More importantly, both “exit mode” and “legacy of the past” approaches analyse transitions almost 
exclusively as domestic processes. They examine nation-states as fixed and isolated entities, un-
derestimating the impact of the international context or that of transnational movements, trans-
fers, and circulation of ideas. They thus neglect the fact that policies of “dealing with the past” may 
well be adopted in a country many years after transition because of international pressure, or be-
cause national elites draw inspiration from similar processes that have been implemented in a 
neighbouring state (see below).
2.3. Transitional justice and the international context
Transitologists have generally considered international factors (such as the international/regional 
security context or the global regime of human rights) as secondary determinants of political tran-
sitions and of processes of dealing with the past.49 Transitional justice policies, it was argued, are 
primarily shaped by the domestic political context (and by a national historical framework of refer-
ence) rather than by international norms and pressures. This argument continues to be supported 
by most of the comparative approaches to the topic that examine local settings as discrete units, 
and not as interconnected elements within a regional or global history.50 
An alternative perspective is offered by scholars who try to integrate national cases into broader 
regional or international contexts. Focusing on the interaction between domestic and international 
actors and norms, they emphasise how these aspects are mutually constitutive.51 First, transitional 
justice measures are strongly influenced by previous experiences of neighbouring countries. The 
model of the Argentinian truth commission rapidly spread to Chile and Uruguay and later across 
continents. Also, the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, established in 1986 as the world’s 
first human rights forensic organisation, started to cooperate with human rights activists from 
neighbouring states, and later expanded its activity in nearly 30 countries throughout the world.52 
Calls for lustration in Romania, Bulgaria or Poland evoked throughout the 1990s the measures al-
ready adopted in Germany in 1990 and Czechoslovakia in 1991. Mutual influences can be found also 
at a transregional level. Eichmann’s trial revived the debates about the Holocaust in Europe.53 Also, 
starting with the 1990s, truth commissions expanded from Latin America to Africa, and Asia. By 
mid-2004 a total of 36 truth or historical commissions had been established worldwide.54 In-depth 
studies of these transregional transfers, however, remain to be written. 
Second, Sikkink and Roht-Arriaza talk about a so-called “boomerang model” whereby external agents 
are used by local activists to amplify and transmit to national authorities their accountability claims.55 
Regional courts, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) or the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR), played an important role in enhancing accountability in postdictatorial Lat-
in America and postcommunist Eastern Europe. The IACHR blocked, for example, the application of 
amnesty laws for crimes against humanity in Peru and Guatemala.56 The ECtHR obliged the Romani-
an state to extend the statute of limitations for crimes committed during the December 1989 events, 
arguing that in many cases investigations had been postponed for political reasons.57 Another impor-
tant mechanism of the “boomerang model” was universal jurisdiction.58 It permitted Latin American 
victims and activists to lodge criminal complaints in European countries such as Spain, France or 
Belgium. Augusto Pinochet’s arrest in London in 1998, the indictment of former Guatemalan dictator 
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Efraín Ríos Mont by a Spanish court in 2006, or the conviction of former Argentinian military officer 
Adolfo Scilingo in 2006, also by a Spanish court, had an important impact on the activity of domestic 
courts in Latin America. Immediately after these events, prosecutions emerged or re-emerged on 
the agenda of national tribunals in Chile, Argentina and Guatemala. 
Third, direct international pressures enhance accountability. Post-1945 West Germany is a good 
example. In 1968 and 1979, due to lively debates within the UN and to demands coming from both 
Eastern (USSR and Poland) and Western European countries (France and Belgium), the Bundestag 
first prolonged and, ultimately, lifted the statutes of limitations for murder in order to allow the con-
tinuation of trials and criminal investigations into national socialist crimes.59 More recently, through 
the creation of international tribunals (former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone) and of 
the International Criminal Court, the United Nations compelled national governments to deal with 
heinous crimes. The European Union also played an important role in states of the former Yugosla-
via, when it made their admission to full membership conditional on the extradition or arraignment 
of war criminals. While the success and the effectiveness of these international pressures are often 
questioned, there is no doubt that they exercise important influence at a local level.60 
3. Time in transitional justice 
The relationship between accountability and the passage of time was a third important issue raised 
by transitologists in the field of transitional justice. Citing the Spanish experience, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter argued that “the passage of time attenuates the bitterest of memories”, and that all po-
litical actors can finally agree “not to dig around the past”.61 Huntington even affirmed that “in new 
democracies, justice comes quickly or it doesn’t come at all”.62 More than 20 years later, the South-
ern European, Latin American and Eastern European experiences showed that calls for justice 
became more likely with the passage of time. Even in Spain, the paradigmatic “model of forgiving 
and forgetting”, the law of historical memory promulgated in 2007, a full 40 years after the transi-
tion, allowed the opening of the archives and the identification of the victims of the Franco regime.63 
This observation about time and transitional justice can be explained on the one hand by the fact 
that experiences examined by transitologists were very recent, so there was little scope to stand 
back and take a broader view. On the other hand, however, scholarship on the “third wave” of 
democratisation (and its subsequent processes of dealing with the past) ignored the post-Second 
World War European experiences of justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The evo-
lution of accountability in post-1945 France or West Germany shows that irruptions of memory 
and the resurgence of retrospective justice are liable to occur decades after the breakdown of the 
former regime. In France, despite the amnesties of the early 1950s that put an end to the collabo-
rators’ trials, criminal proceedings re-emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s, culminating in the con-
viction of prominent former Nazis or members of the Vichy elite, such as Klaus Barbie or Maurice 
Papon.64 In West Germany, a culture of impunity with regard to Nazi perpetrators was endorsed 
by the national judiciary in the 1950s, in response to the internationally imposed Nuremberg trials. 
Nevertheless, accountability events re-emerged in 1957 with the Einsatzgruppen trials, in 1963 
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with the Auschwitz trials, and in 1979 with criminal investigations into cases of maladministration 
of justice by the national socialist judiciary. 65 
Historical approaches to memory and transitional justice illustrate the fact that the past can con-
tinue to “irrupt” in the present.66 According to Wouters, even in societies that “succeeded in building 
a strong national consensual regime, memory incidents stay present right under the surface … 
Alternative memories were never buried or forgotten but simply dormant or invisible (meaning 
not easily perceivable)”.67 Bevernage, relying to Derrida’s and Althusser’s works, thus argues that 
the past continues to disrupt the present, simply because historical processes resist “being frozen” 
and always contain “delays, survivals, and unfinished projects”.68 While the passage of time does 
indubitably make retributive justice more difficult (for legal or biological reasons), trials may occur 
many years after transition. The generational shift, the evolution of the international human rights 
regime, the experience of neighbouring countries, and the emergence of a new domestic political 
context, are all elements that can contribute to accountability or memory shifts.69 Thus, the pas-
sage of time does not necessarily alleviate the bitterest of memories. Although the preoccupation 
with justice and memory is sometimes replaced by other social and political concerns related to 
the present context, claims for accountability and remembrance can resurface and have an impact 
several decades after the collapse of dictatorial regimes. 
Conclusions
In the 1980s and 1990s, theories of democratic transitions nurtured important theoretical debates 
about postdictatorial accountability in the context of the “third wave” of democratisation. On the 
one hand, scholars investigated the relationship between retributive justice and democratic sta-
bility and consolidation. On the other, transitologists were the first to interrogate the determinants 
of transitional justice, with a view to establishing causalities between types of dictatorial regimes, 
exit modes from authoritarianism, and justice mechanisms. Finally, they tackled the relationship 
between justice and the passage of time. These topics remain even today central themes of tran-
sitional justice studies. However, the approaches pioneered by transitologists, and embraced lat-
er by other scholars (especially in the field of political science and law), are not without their flaws. 
Most of the studies that deal with the relationship between justice and democratisation inherited 
from transitology a normative approach to social phenomena. The purpose was not only to offer a 
comprehensive analysis, but also to formulate guidelines for installing and consolidating democ-
racy. This approach favoured prescription instead of inclusive accounts of events, and it often ra-
tionalised a posteriori the “right solutions” supposed to head in the “right direction”.70 
These studies adopted a teleological perspective on transitions supposedly bound for democra-
cy, and overlooked similar transitional justice processes unfolding in dictatorial settings. It con-
sequently ignored comparisons and connections between the liberal “third way” approaches to 
transitional justice and processes occurring in other contexts such as postcolonial Africa or the 
state-socialist world. A broader understanding of transitional justice beyond the framework of 
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democratic transformation would shed light on the global interactions of ideas about transitional 
accountability between 1945 and the present day. 
Moreover, approaches inspired by transitology remained short-term in focus and lacked “historical 
depth”. Studies that emphasised the impact of the exit mode from authoritarianism ignored struc-
tural constraints and conceptualised the “inaugural configurations” of democracy as ahistorical 
moments. They also analysed transitional justice merely as a product of politics, and paid almost 
no attention to legal, cultural and psychological aspects that were constitutive parts of law. “Legacy 
of the past” approaches overlooked the rational choices of various actors and opted for a sort of “ru-
dimentary historical determinism”,71 which was rooted in the nature of the former nondemocratic 
regime. They neglected longue durée dynamics, ignoring the pre-dictatorial temporal frameworks. 
The attempt to establish general typologies and causalities often failed to account for and explain 
local particularities. Case studies of different countries or regions have subsequently shown just 
how crucial the historicising of national/local processes within a wider temporality is to under-
standing transitional justice. Such an approach is itself not without its dangers, however, as it runs 
the risk of becoming too particularistic and overdetailed. 
Finally, because they focused on transitions as discrete units, theoretical perspectives inherited from 
transitology underestimated the role of international pressure, as well as the importance of the transna-
tional circulation of ideas. Domestic trials and purges were rarely integrated into a broader regional and 
global perspective, whereby national and international processes are viewed as mutually constitutive.
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